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NOTES AND COMMENT

creditor and cited the cases of Whetherell v. O'Brien, Chickering v.
Bastress,7 Richardson v. Olmnstead, and Longergan v. Stewart,' to
support its contentions.
The Court in construing the criminal statute, which resembles our
own Section 343.17, says: "There must, however, in any event, be a
bailment in order that the relationship of bailee exists. There is no
bailment here, and therefore no bailee or larceny as bailee. The relationship existing between plaintiff in error and the complaining witness is that of debtor and creditor."
In the case of Burns v. State, supra, the Court held that a person
picking up money that was thrown away by an insane individual
became a bailee of the money and when he converted it, he could be
prosecuted under the statutes for the crime of larceny as bailee. The
two cases are easily distinguishable; in the Wisconsin case, the person picking up the money had to return the same money to the bailor;
in the Illinois case, the broker had no such duty imposed upon him
by his contractual engagement.
An extended annotation on the "relation between customer and broker
receiving bonds or other securities for sale or exchange" can be found
in 52 A.L.R. 501.
SAM GOLDENBERG

Master and Servant; Workmen's Compensation Act; Indemnity
to Permanently Disabled Minor Employee.
"Proper administration of the Workmen's Compensation Act requires appreciation of the manifest legislative purpose thereof, i.e., to
abolish the common law system of compensating injured employees as
unsuitable to modern conditions and conceptions of moral obligations,
and substitute therefor one based on the highest present conception of
man's humnnity to man and obligations to the employee class."'
The instant case 2 presents an interpretation of a heretofore unconstrued provision contained in the Workmen's Compensation Act,
which interpretation serves to carry out the above quoted purpose.
In brief substance, the facts of the case are these: the defendant in
this action (plaintiff below) a minor, was permanently disabled while
in the employ of the appellant, and was awarded a weekly compensation of $22.50 under the following provision:

"If an employee is a minor and is permanently disabled, his weekly
earnings on which to compute the indemnity accruing to him for permanent disability shall be determined on the basis of the earnings that
such minor, if not disabled, probably would earn after attaining the age
of twenty-one years. Unless otherwise established his earnings shall
be taken as equivalent13 to the amount upon which maximum weekly
indemnity is payable."
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'City of Milwaukee v. Miller, 354 Wis. 652.
'Badger Carton Co. v. Industrial ComMnIsiolt of Wisconsh, 218 N.W. 19o,
- Wis -.
' Section io.1, sub section i, Wis. R.S., 1925.
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The defendant was a high school graduate, earning, at the time of
the accident which disabled her, $12.50 per week.
The award of $22.50 per week was set aside by the Circuit Court,
stating as its ground that compensation must be based upon the wages
paid by the industry. On appeal, the question was presented: Where
a minor is permanently disabled, and has earned but trivial wages
up to the time of the disability, upon what basis may the Industrial
Commission adequately compute such minor's probable earnings after
he or she arrives at majority?
Any award as to probable future earnings is at best mere conjecture; and this is especially true in the instance of attempting to adequately determine what a minor, who has never had the opportunity to
demonstrate his full earning capacity, will probably earn upon reaching his majority. The major consideration of the court in the present
case, then, is to define a scientific and fair method of determining
awards in such cases so as to render the statute workable, and secondarily, to employ such method and thus determine the award in this
case.
There were three standards from which the court had a choice
for determining awards. The first was that the compensation
should be computed upon what the minor would earn immediately
after arriving at the age of twenty-one years; the second, that it may be
computed on an unlimited amount of time subsequent to reaching
majority; or third, that the compensation should be based upon a reasonable time after reaching majority. The first proposition, embracing
the word "immediately," implies an abruptness, an impulsiveness, which
is, under the circumstances, repugnant to the judicial mind. The earnings of a working person immediately upon reaching majority certainly are not representative of the earning capacity of such person
during his more mature years. The second proposition, while more
acceptable than the first, involved too much speculation. Good fortune
at times enriches men far beyond what the average person of the same
ability, education, and experience attains. And the converse is not
untrue. Hence the speculative attribute of the word "unlimited" as
used in the second proposition warranted its rejection by the court. The
key-word of the third proposition denotes the essence of the basis of
computation adopted. The word "reasonable" is not arbitrary. It
is elastic, rendering the rule adaptable to practically any situation.
Combined with a consideration of the ability, education, and experience
of the minor, this basis of computation allows the court to award the
fairest compensation humanly possible.
Ultimately, the third proposition fulfills the purpose of the act, as
denoted in the above quotation, and renders the platitude of "man's
humanity to man" full of meaning. And having determined the above
basis as the most reliable method of computation, the court proceeded
to affirm the award of the Industrial Commission as an amount which
the said minor would probably earn within a reasonable time after
reaching her majority.
STEWART G. HONECK

